



he period following World War II saw
an increasing trend towards the
removal of trade barriers among a
growing number of countries. In its initial
phase at least, even pre-dating the war, this
trend was aimed at reversing the results of
the backlash against an initial wave of “glob-
alization” which took place in the late 1800s
and early 1900s. This backlash had taken the
form of almost three decades of inward-look-
ing immigration and trade policies, con-
tributing to the global economic devastation
of the 1930s.
Canadian governments were at the fore-
front of this post-war gradual opening up of
borders. Beginning in the late 1930s, they
entered into a large number of multilateral,
regional and bilateral agreements that gave
effect to rules of ever greater sophistication con-
cerning the rights and obligations of states
towards foreign traders, goods, services or
investments. It can be said that this trend
reached a pinnacle in the late 1980s and the
1990s, when three key agreements involving
Canada were implemented, along with numer-
ous smaller ones. The three were the Canada-
US Free Trade Agreement (FTA, signed in
1987, implemented in 1989), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA,
1992 and 1994) and the series of documents
resulting in 1994 from the Uruguay Round of
multilateral negotiations which created the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
The question I have been asked to
answer in this article is what contribution
these and other recent exercises in trade lib-
eralization have made to social progress. As is
clear from the other articles in this volume,
the question of what constitutes social
progress is a very complex one. The number
of possible indicators that can be used to
gauge social progress comprise real income
levels and trends, the distribution of this
income, the occurrence of poverty, population
health, literacy, the quality of the environ-
ment, social integration and cohesion and
gender equity. As Lars Osberg notes in his
article in this volume, these and other indi-
cators of social progress can be strongly
dependent on each other. The implication is
that by affecting even one of these indicators,




































































schwanen.qxd  24/05/01  9:41 AM  Page 161characteristics, and follow each group’s rel-
ative employment and wage performance
through the 1990s. In a final substantive
section, I will attempt to link differences in
characteristics and outcomes among the var-
ious groups to the available theory and evi-
dence on trade liberalization, and to what
we know about the evolution of the global,
North American and Canadian labour mar-
kets in the 1990s.
LINKS BETWEEN TRADE 
LIBERALIZATION AND 
SOCIAL PROGRESS
Trade allows each region to specialize
in the type of production for which its
resources, skills or capital (dubbed “factors of
production”) are relatively better suited, and
to exchange this production against imports.
Thus freer trade makes a greater amount of
goods and services available for a given
amount of resources or effort expended. This
allows a better fulfilment of societal needs
and wants on average. In addition, increased
global competition forces domestic firms to
look for additional or new sources of effi-
ciency gains — thereby generally helping to
raise standards of living through a less waste-
ful use of resources (see, for example, Baldwin
and Caves 1997).
These effects form the traditional basis
of support for trade liberalization. There is a
large body of evidence for the normally posi-
tive impacts of more open trade on average
standards of living, including for those at the
bottom of the economic scale (for a recent
study, see Dollar and Kraay 2000, who survey
countries experiencing a wide range of eco-
nomic circumstances). In Canada’s case, two
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We know that there is currently some
political unease both about the idea of liber-
alization and about the version of it which
has been embedded in specific trade agree-
ments. Analytically, the notion of free trade
and the form it takes in actual trade agree-
ments are very much separable. One can
agree with the ideal yet disagree with the
form under which “free trade agreements”
actually provide for liberalized trade — not
least because in many cases they retain barri-
ers that seem to skew the expected idealized
results, particularly for countries with rela-
tively modest commercial clout like Canada.
These differences can be very important, and
also imply that trade agreements must be
examined on a case-by-case basis.
Nevertheless, all freer trade agreements
worthy of the name provide for some
increased access to foreign products, at a
minimum via tariff reductions on goods. It
is the effects of this form of trade liberaliza-
tion, particularly its plausible impact on the
Canadian labour market in the 1990s, which
will occupy the bulk of this article. However,
I will also point to some other important fea-
tures of specific trade agreements, as they
interact with the effects of lower tariffs.
I will attempt to determine the
impact of trade liberalization by, first,
quickly surveying the linkages between
trade and “factor prices,” such as wages. I
will then examine some existing facts and
studies assessing the Canadian experience
with trade liberalization, before conducting
my own assessment of Canada’s trade-liber-
alizing policies, mainly by dividing
Canadian industries into groups according
to their sensitivity and response to these
policies. I will draw a comparative picture
of workers in these groups according to key
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Steven Murphy note (1999, p. ii) that since
exports have consistently yielded above-aver-
age productivity and returns to labour, the
sharp rise in Canadian exports since the 1960s
has helped lift Canadian productivity and
returns to labour overall and liberalized trade
has spurred many Canadian exports beyond
the traditional resource-based industries of lore
(Schwanen 1993).
Nevertheless, the actual and perceived
effects of more open trade on an array of
social variables can play an even greater role,
in its acceptance or rejection by countries,
than the benefits in terms of average
incomes. It is well established theoretically
and empirically that opening an economy to
trade will affect different types of “factors of
production” differently, depending on the
relative abundance or scarcity of these factors
in the economies of the trading partners.
Easier trade will tend to equalize the price of
these factors across countries, because bring-
ing together hitherto separate markets for
products will implicitly combine their mar-
kets for factors of production as well. One
such factor is of course labour, which will be
affected differently from holders of various
forms of physical or financial capital. Within
labour itself, the impact may differ sharply
across various skill levels. Thus, as well as the
overall level of economic activity, trade can
affect income distribution, a relevant indica-
tor of social progress.
The key point is that trade liberaliza-
tion will likely affect groups differently,
because protection from foreign competition
usually benefits some groups in society
whereas others would benefit from more
open trade. It should be emphasized that the
group or groups most vulnerable to liberal-
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ization need not be the same across countries
or, within a country, across all points in time.
Indeed, in traditional models of trade liber-
alization, the result of factor-price equaliza-
tion is that if one group — say, unskilled
workers — loses in one country, it is because
their counterparts in other countries benefit.
Factor-price equalization is not only
the result of easier trade across borders: it can
occur through the migration of factors them-
selves, whether people or capital. Indeed,
some trade agreements such as the FTA and
NAFTA promote factor-price equalization in
a more direct way than through trade. They
enable certain types of workers in high
demand to move more easily across borders,
facilitating the movement of factors of pro-
duction themselves. This can substitute for
the cross-border trade that would have been
taking place had the factors been immobile.
A historical perspective on these phe-
nomena is instructive. When many European
countries became more open to agricultural
imports in the late 1800s and early 1900s,
hitherto heavily protected landowners suf-
fered, along with agricultural workers. But
workers in the emerging urban industrial
sectors benefited substantially from a rise in
their standard of living due to cheaper food,
and there was a consequent overall reduction
in inequalities. Subsequently, however, many
agricultural workers, and others in countries
that had remained closed to agricultural
imports, emigrated from Europe to the
United States and Canada. This movement
served to sharply reduce wages in North
America in relation to the returns on capital,
a situation that, politically, favoured a grad-
ual retreat from open immigration policies
(Williamson 1998). That story involves ele-
ments of technological change, trade liberal-
schwanen.qxd  24/05/01  9:41 AM  Page 163sistent with those of a number of industry-
level studies. Thus, more trade leading to
bigger scale can lead to an increase in the rel-
ative demand for skilled labour. A comple-
mentary explanation is that suggested by
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999). In their
self-described “North-North trade explana-
tion for increasing wage inequality,” they
show that, by increasing the relative returns
to innovation, open trade even between struc-
turally similar countries (in terms of factor
availability) will reduce the relative wages of
unskilled workers.
Finally, Zhu (2000) shows that, in a
context where one economy, “North,” is driv-
en by product innovation and another,
“South,” specializes in less skill-intensive
goods, North will constantly specialize in the
production of “new” goods. “New” goods use
relatively more skills than “old” goods, the
production of which is constantly transferred
to South. But these ongoing moves decrease
the relative demand for unskilled labour in
North while increasing demand for skilled
labour in South, thus exacerbating inequali-
ties in both countries. Far from simply
adding to the factor-price equalization
model, in which at least the decline in rela-
tive wages for unskilled workers in North
would be accompanied by a rise for similar
workers in South, this analysis challenges the
model’s basic relevance.
In this context, it is also instructive to
find that trade agreements can seek to direct-
ly influence relative factor prices across all the
countries to which they apply, by strength-
ening the position of the owners of one or
another type of factors. For example, the
three agreements cited above have increased
the length of protection for pharmaceutical
patents and intellectual property rights gen-
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ization and mass migration, all leading to the
convergence of factor prices across continents.
The impact of trade goes beyond that
of making factor prices converge across coun-
tries, however. A large body of literature
shows that trade can also move the relative
earnings of different factors similarly across
countries which liberalize, even when liber-
alization occurs between countries with the
same factor endowments (e.g., proportion of
skilled vs. unskilled labour) and access to
technology. This last point is of central inter-
est to modern inquiries into the impact of
trade, because over 50 percent of world trade
occurs between advanced industrial
economies. Indeed, in general, differences in
factor endowments, which in traditional
models would be driving trade, explain only
a small part of actual global trade (underes-
timating it between rich countries, overesti-
mating it between rich and poor countries),
a fact which economists refer to as a case of
“missing trade” (Helpman 1999).
Other than factor-price equalization,
then, the literature points to two key links
between trade and factor prices: scale and
innovation. In a recent paper, Antweiler and
Trefler (2000) show that taking scale
economies into account explains a significant
part of the “missing trade.” This is because
differences in the scale of industries across
countries mean that there will be differences
across countries in factors required per unit
of output (or, linking backwards, scale
economies will influence the amount of
trade, given factor abundance). They also
show that for at least a third of the 27 man-
ufacturing industries they examine, larger
output is associated with a sharp rise in the
demand for high school graduates relative to
high school dropouts, a result which is con-
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erally. This does not have much to do with
trade liberalization per se, but rather con-
cerns what are the fair “terms of trade” —
that is, the price and conditions at which
transactions between exporters and importers
of intellectual capital will take place. This
type of development can certainly have posi-
tive effects overall by encouraging research
and development and creative endeavours in
general. But it is obvious from the models
presented by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(1999) and Zhou (2000) that it can also have
an impact on the relative benefits that dif-
ferent groups of individuals within countries
can expect from particular trade agreements.
I will return to these models below
when examining the links between the
impact of Canadian trade liberalization and
recent labour-market developments. For now,
I will turn to a description of Canada’s recent
trade-liberalizing experience.
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE OF
TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE
1990s
At the end of the 1980s, effective
Canadian tariff rates against US goods, which
have traditionally served to shield domestic
manufacturers from foreign competition,
averaged some 8 percent against goods
imported from the United States and 15 per-
cent against goods imported from other
countries (Trefler 2000, p. 12). Due to the
staged liberalization scheduled under all
three key agreements mentioned here, cus-
toms tariffs on the vast majority of items
were eliminated on trade between Canada
and the United States, and are gradually
heading to zero on trade with Mexico under
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the terms of the NAFTA. And under the
WTO and predecessor agreements, further
tariff reductions have been taking place
between Canada and virtually all other coun-
tries. These include countries such as China
which are not members of the WTO but on
which Canada chooses to bestow Most-
Favoured-Nation tariff treatment (that is,
treatment at least as good as those countries
would get if they were WTO members).
Even by 1995, when the new WTO deal was
only beginning to bite, Canada’s effective tar-
iffs against non-US imports had fallen to less
than 10 percent.
Some goods-producing sectors, howev-
er, remain significantly protected by tariffs
and other barriers. This is the case for certain
agricultural and cultural products, for many
types of public procurement contracts, and,
implicitly, for the industries affected by fre-
quent anti-dumping and countervailing duty
actions.
Although in fact much effort was
expended in negotiating more open trade in
services, the extent to which trade agree-
ments have directly affected services indus-
tries is less clear-cut. In the FTA, services
liberalization was in most cases prospective
only, affecting measures that Canada or the
United States might take in the future, with
most existing barriers being spared. In the
NAFTA, many services sectors and large
swaths of policy areas involving public serv-
ices were excluded from trade-liberalizing
rules. And in those services sectors where spe-
cific trade liberalization rules were agreed to
under the WTO, such as telecommunications
and financial services, many countries includ-
ing Canada were in any event undertaking
reforms which were compatible with, but
separate from, the rules agreed to in trade
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taking place while or even before the trade
agreements took effect, it is hard to distin-
guish between the two sources of change.
This particular difficulty of distin-
guishing the impact of trade liberalization in
services from other influences explains why
many studies of trade liberalization focus on
the manufacturing sector. This is both useful
and problematic. It is useful because the
manufacturing sector clearly bore the brunt
of trade liberalizing policies, in particular the
removal of tariffs. It is problematic because
the services sector cannot have remained
unaffected, even by the liberalization of mer-
chandise trade only. 
For example, the result of one promi-
nent modelling exercise, completed before
the FTA came into force, suggested that,
although no job gain in manufacturing
would result from the agreement, the latter
would improve productivity (output per
worker) in manufacturing (Economic Council
of Canada 1988). This, in turn, would lead
to rising real incomes and support a greater
number of services jobs. Furthermore, the
large increase in trade flows during the 1990s
must have had an impact on services that are
used in the production and trade of manu-
factures, such as transportation or warehous-
ing services. Finally, trade in services would
have been facilitated by various provisions of
trade agreements that strengthen the protec-
tion of foreign investors and of intellectual
property and facilitate the movement of busi-
ness and technical personnel, particularly
between Canada and the United States.
Thus, it is no surprise that, as we will
see presently, trade-related restructuring in
the 1990s did occur across Canadian servic-
es industries as well as in manufacturing.
Trade and Industrial
Restructuring
According to a detailed survey recent-
ly conducted in late 1998 by the Bank of
Canada, covering some 140 firms represen-
tative of Canada’s industrial structure
(Kwan 2000), 87 percent of Canadian firms
were engaged in some form of restructuring
in the 1990s. This compares to 36 percent
that had engaged in restructuring in the
1980s (the survey defines restructuring as
“a fundamental change in the way firms
conduct their operations.”)
The survey asked firms to give their
reasons for restructuring and the type of
restructuring in which they had engaged. I
have rearranged the responses in order to
distinguish between those having some
plausible link to trade liberalization and
the others (see Table 1). With respect to the
reasons for restructuring, I have separated
those involving trans-border considerations
from the others. With respect to the type
of restructuring undertaken, I have sepa-
rated the responses that had a clear geo-
graphical component to them (e.g.
“expanded outside Canada”) from those that
seemed independent of location.
The extent of formal trade liberal-
ization in the 1990s is obviously captured
here by the emergence of trade agreements
among the reasons given for restructuring.
However, in manufacturing, the share of
responses pinpointing other cross-border
factors (such as greater US competition)
actually fell in the 1990s, so that all trans-
border considerations together accounted
for about half of the reasons for restruc-
turing in both decades. One possible
interpretation of this unchanged ratio is
the role played by the Canadian dollar in
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petition from US manufacturers in the
1990s. Another is that, for at least some
manufacturers, free trade agreements put
a more identifiable face on US competition
that was already felt for other reasons. In
contrast, for services firms, there was a
noticeable increase (from 14 to 25 percent)
in the share of cross-border considerations
(both trade agreements and increased US
competition and the like) reported as rea-
sons for restructuring.
A final note about the table: In both
manufacturing and services, there was
practically no increase in the share of
responses indicating a move abroad as a
response to restructuring. In contrast,
there was a noticeable drop in the share of
respondents indicating that restructuring
took the form of expansion in the
Canadian market. Instead of expansion,
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restructuring increasingly took the form
of introducing new technologies or other
changes to existing Canadian operations.
How this is to be interpreted is unclear, as
the survey captures only firms with exist-
ing Canadian operations — it does not
include firms that went out of business or
left Canada at some point during the two
decades. Nevertheless, it suggests that
there was an increased reluctance to
expand in Canada in the 1990s which was
general — that is, not specifically related
to cross-border competitiveness, and pos-
sibly more related to the poor economic
growth performance that pervaded much
of the period.
This overall picture of industrial
restructuring will help put in perspective
the following more detailed assessment of
the plausible effects of trade liberalization
on labour markets.
TABLE 1
Reasons for and Type of Restructuring in Canadian Industry
Goods Services
Share of All Responses Given (%) 1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s
Reasons for Restructuring
Trade agreements 0 12 0 3
Other trans-border considerations 48 38 14 25
(e.g., greater foreign competition)
Other considerations 52 50 86 72
(e.g., new technology, regulation)
Total 100 100 100 100
Type of Restructuring
Geographical: Positive 33 20 28 16
(e.g., expand Canadian operations)
Geographical: Negative 17 25 16 17
(e.g., relocate functions o/s Canada)
Non-geographical 50 55 56 67
(e.g., new technology, larger size)
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Kwan (2000) and author’s calculations.
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ed from less efficient to more efficient sec-
tors. This explanation is consistent with the
suggestions of other studies that free trade
will lead to a shift, rather than an overall
decline, in manufacturing unemployment.
Trefler also finds that the earnings of
production workers in the sectors most
affected by trade liberalization, and even in
manufacturing as a whole, rose as a result of
the FTA tariff cuts. In contrast, he discerns
no impact on earnings of non-production
workers. He concludes that these cuts “min-
imally mitigated rising earnings equality”
(2000, p. iii). His results, not uncharacteris-
tically, are based on a highly disaggregated
(213 industries) and carefully constructed
database of the manufacturing sector.
Nevertheless, any conclusion from this work
that inequalities have been reduced as a result
of the gains of a (very broad) class of produc-
tion workers may be premature. In part, this
is because Trefler’s estimates incorporate the
combined effect of Canada-US liberalization,
without distinguishing between sectors par-
ticularly vulnerable to imports and those
having benefited from freer exports.
Indeed, using a 19-industry breakdown
of the manufacturing sector, Beaulieu (2000)
estimates that the negative employment
impact of Canadian tariff reductions in
Canada’s manufacturing sector was borne
almost entirely by production workers, while
being felt little by non-production workers.
He explains this result by noting that the
most protected industries before the tariff cut
were indeed intensive in the use of produc-
tion workers. He further notes that this result
is consistent with the fact that less-skilled
voters in Canada opposed the FTA, whereas
skilled voters tended to support it.
Daniel Schwanen
Recent Canadian Studies
It can fairly be said that studies of the
actual impact of trade liberalization in
Canada in the 1990s have been sparse and
have tended to focus on the bilateral Canada-
US agreement. All of these studies duly note
that trade liberalization meant serious adjust-
ments in some industries, implying that a
number of Canadians experienced some neg-
ative impacts from the agreements.
Two recent studies of particular note
are those of Daniel Trefler (2000) and Eugene
Beaulieu (2000). Both studies are of interest
in a discussion of the possible social impact
of trade liberalization in that they estimate
its differential impact on two groups: “pro-
duction” workers (those directly involved in
the manufacturing process) and “non-pro-
duction” workers (management, sales, cleri-
cal and research personnel, among others).
This is a crude breakdown, to be sure, but
still of interest, as individuals in the latter
group earn, on average, considerably more
than those in the former.
Trefler finds that a quarter of the
decline in Canadian manufacturing employ-
ment between 1989 and 1996 was due to the
effects of the FTA. The benefits, as he puts
it, are that Canada increased its efficiency in
the sectors which were previously most pro-
tected and reallocated resources from ineffi-
cient to efficient sectors — that is,
productivity (output per resources) also
increased as a result of trade liberalization. It
should be noted that the period examined by
Trefler was one of actual decline in manufac-
turing employment, which has since reverted
back to near its pre-1989 levels. Indeed,
Trefler suggests that the employment losses
as a result of liberalization are temporary
whereas the gains in productivity are perma-
168
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IN CANADA ACCORDING TO
TRADE SENSITIVITY
In this section, I extend a procedure
which I found useful in an earlier exercise
(Schwanen 1997). It consists of dividing
manufacturing industries into five groups
according to their degree of sensitivity to
trade liberalization. This allows for a com-
parison of certain key characteristics and
labour-market outcomes for workers within
the different groups. I have similarly divid-
ed services-producing industries into three
groups according to sensitivity to trade.
Two aspects of this classification
should be emphasized. First, these groups
are mutually exclusive — each industry is
assigned to one group only, so there is no
overlap between the groups. Second, the
groups add up to the total of all manufac-
turing and of all services industries (exclud-
ing the public service and social services),
allowing for a complete picture of develop-
ments within these two broad sectors. The
emphasis on relative performance within the
sectors is justified by the fact that whatev-
er the impact of trade liberalization on over-
all income levels, its effects must always be
traceable through its differential impact on
various sectors. Furthermore, an approach
that compares different groups of industries
allows us to say something about the plau-
sible links between trade and various social
variables and trends describing or affecting
workers in these industries. And finally,
since the period under consideration —
1988 through 1999 — includes a cyclical
peak, a recession, a recovery, and an expan-
sion, a look at how industry groups have
fared relative to each other allows us to
abstract in a basic fashion from these cycli-
cal factors affecting the overall economy.
Sensitivity to trade liberalization was
defined differently for manufacturing and for
services. For manufacturing industries, the
degree of sensitivity to liberalization was
determined first by whether or not the
Canadian and US import tariffs had been
eliminated specifically as result of the FTA.
It is assumed here that industries already lib-
eralized before the FTA, along with a handful
of industries that remain protected to this
day, did not see their competitive conditions
radically change as a result of trade liberal-
ization in the 1990s.1 Here I call this group
the “non-affected” industries. Of course,
these industries likely experienced some indi-
rect impacts from liberalization — for exam-
ple, a reduction in the cost of inputs.
Nevertheless, many of them were already
characterized by free trade across a range of
inputs as well, such as automobiles and parts
or aircraft and parts. Thus they form a “con-
trol group” in relation to all the other indus-
tries that directly experienced liberalization
during the decade.
The liberalized industries were sepa-
rated into four groups, according to whether
they were characterized by a large expansion
in exports, imports or two-way trade, or by
slow growth in trade between Canada and
the region with which trade was being liber-
alized (United States, Mexico or non-NAFTA
countries). A “large” expansion implies that
trade in that industry has accelerated relative
to a pre-liberalization period, and that it is
growing faster than trade for the same indus-
try with other regions with which Canadian
trade was not concurrently being liberalized.
The industries thus classified are listed in
appendix table A1.
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interpreting the meaning of the classifica-
tion I am using. Industries experiencing lit-
tle growth in trade may nevertheless have
experienced significant pressures —
through prices, for example — necessitat-
ing a major restructuring just to stay com-
petitive. However, price changes are
unlikely to take place without significant
increases in imports, so it is possible to
describe the trade-induced competitive
pressures faced by various sectors in terms
of more or less rapid increases in trade flows.
This approach also inspired the study from
which the procedure I use here was origi-
nally derived (Bednarzik 1993).
Services industries were simply ranked
according to sensitivity of employment in these
industries to trade generally (se appendix table
A2). “Trade-sensitive” employment in an
industry was calculated as the average of the
number of jobs in that industry that are direct-
ly or indirectly dependent on all Canadian
exports, and of the number of jobs the indus-
try would notionally have if all Canadian
imports were replaced by domestic production.
These numbers were derived from Dungan and
Murphy (1999, Tables A.3A and A.5A), who
used Canada’s 1992 input-output matrix for
their calculations. It would be possible to clas-
sify services industries according to whether
they were themselves liberalized by trade
agreements. However, such an exercise does
not yield a discernible pattern for the liberal-
ized and non-liberalized groupings that might
be suggestive of a direct impact of the agree-
ments on trade in services (Schwanen 1997). It
seems more useful to consider what impact the
large increase in trade as a whole, which we
know took place following liberalization, may
have had on services industries in Canada.
After classifying the industries in this
way, I then chart the evolution of total
employment and earnings for workers in
these various groups, relative to the manu-
facturing and services industry averages,
respectively. The data come from the Survey
of Employment, Earnings and Hours —
which also dictated the list of manufacturing
industries considered here. One limitation,
therefore, is that the self-employed are not
included in the following analysis. Let us
now look at the results for employment and
earnings trends among the various manufac-
turing and services groupings.
Employment
It is unlikely that the liberalization
begun under the FTA had a negative effect
on Canadian employment as a whole (Fortin,
1999). But its differential impact across
industries could still hold potentially differ-
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turing employment, divided among the five
industry groups described above. It depicts
quite contrasting experiences in terms of
employment growth. Initially, the relative
“winners” in terms of employment perform-
ance were those sectors that were not direct-
ly subject to new waves of trade liberalization
in the 1990s. After 1992, employment in
those liberalized sectors characterized by
increasing exports also began to outperform
employment in the average manufacturing
industry. In liberalized sectors that experi-
enced a surge in imports, employment was
already, in the mid-1980s, dropping relative
to the rest of manufacturing, a trend perhaps
influenced by firms in these sectors antici-
pating the effects of the agreement. But it
dropped even more markedly after the FTA
came into effect in 1989. Another group
which experienced a decline in its share of
manufacturing employment was the one
composed of sectors for which neither exports
nor imports rose markedly. This could mean
that these industries attempted to fight
imports by cutting labour costs. This inter-
pretation certainly does not mesh with the
fact that the relative reduction for this group
began well after the entry into force of the
FTA, although it is more consistent with the
fact that earnings in this group deteriorated
quickly in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
But in many instances — fish products, ship-
building, petroleum refineries, cement,
asbestos come to mind — these industries
were facing crises or pressures to restructure
that were not induced by 1990s trade liber-
alization per se.
Turning to employment in services
(Chart 2), the rise in the share of employment
in trade-sensitive industries after 1992 is
remarkable when compared to its stability in
the 1980s and to the stability of the some-
what less trade-sensitive groups. The simi-
larly remarkable decline among the group
least sensitive to trade reflects a number of
key factors, including cutbacks in publicly
funded services such as health care. It is far
more likely that these cuts were due to other
factors and policies affecting the economy
than to forces related to trade liberalization.
Earnings
A key variable allowing us to evaluate
the impact of trade liberalization is the earn-
ings of those affected. Chart 3 depict the evo-
lution of average weekly earnings (including
overtime pay) for the five manufacturing-
industry groups.2
Here again, some patterns are quite
stark. The relative earnings of workers in
industries not affected in the 1990s (i.e.
mostly already free) exhibited some gyrations
but no trend over the period. However, earn-
ings of those in export-expanding industries
rose significantly and steadily after 1993,
roughly the period when employment in
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ably beyond their pre-FTA average. In con-
trast, workers in industries characterized by
a strong import surge, whose earnings were
already below the average for the manufac-
turing sector, experienced a further, more
marked, decline following trade liberaliza-
tion in the late 1980s to mid-1990s, relative
to average manufacturing earnings, and
became the lowest-paid group in manufac-
turing. The chart does suggest that a bottom
may have been found for workers in these
industries around 1995. Workers in which
exports expanded along with imports fared
relatively well by comparison.
Earnings in the three services groups
also exhibit sharply divergent trends, as they
do with respect to employment (see Chart 4).
Trade-sensitive services, already the most
highly paid services group, exhibit a huge
gain of 8 percentage points relative to the
earnings of other services workers (and indeed
relative to aggregate earnings in all Canadian
industries). Earnings of workers in services
with medium trade sensitivity also rose some-
what during the period. Earnings in the least
trade-sensitive sectors (by far the largest
group) were in contrast relatively compressed.
Summary
Employment and earnings patterns in
the 1990s seem to have favoured workers in
export-oriented manufacturing industries,
while those in industries with rapidly growing
imports were hit relatively hard. Workers in
industries characterized by two-way trade
expansion do not seem to have suffered rela-
tively in aggregate, at least in comparisons of
the latest data with pre-FTA data. Earnings
patterns appear to be positively correlated with
employment patterns in both export-expand-
ing and import-expanding industries, sug-
gesting both that lower wages are not sufficient
to make Canada competitive against imports
and that high wages are not a deterrent to good
economic performance on the export front. It
also seems that many industries declined for
reasons other than those related to trade, a find-
ing that appears to match the results of the





















































1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999







































schwanen.qxd  24/05/01  9:41 AM  Page 172WHO WAS AFFECTED 
BY TRADE-INDUCED 
RESTRUCTURING?
Given the differences in the labour-
market outcomes (earnings and employment)
among workers in various industry groups
according to trade sensitivity, it would be
useful to determine whether these groups can
also be distinguished by the type of workers
they employ. Such a finding could signal that
trade liberalization affected workers differ-
ently not only according to the industry in
which they worked, but also according to the
characteristics of the workers themselves.
While the former might not indicate a prob-
lem as long as those employed in “losing”
industries are willing and able to move into
“winning” industries, the latter might be
problematic from the viewpoint of re-
employment or the maintenance of income
for those affected by trade liberalization.
For this purpose, I have estimated the
composition of workers in the various indus-
try groups according to three variables, edu-
cational achievement, gender and age, for
1986, the year of the last Canadian census
before the FTA. These data are shown in
tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
Educational Achievement
Table 2 presents a summary profile of
Canadian workers in the five manufacturing
groups and three services groups according
to educational achievement.
The data suggest that industries
which have fared the worst under trade lib-
eralization in terms of both employment
and earnings were those which, a few years
before the FTA, most intensively employed
workers with a high school education or
less. This is consistent with the findings of
Dungan and Murphy (1999, p. 68), that
import competition in the Canadian market
in recent years has increasingly affected
lower-skilled workers. Their results also
show that export-related employment in
Canada has evolved, over the decades,
towards industries employing more highly
educated workers. Of note is the education-
al composition of services industries
grouped according to sensitivity to trade.
Both the most and least trade-sensitive
industries employed a remarkably high pro-
portion of university graduates, mirrored by
a remarkably low proportion of people with
high school only. The explanation for this is
straightforward — the trade-sensitive group
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TABLE 2
Composition of Employees According to
Educational Attainment: 1986
High Some
School or  Post-  University
% of All Workers Less  Secondary and More
Manufacturing:
Not affected by FTA 65 27 8
Slow trade expansion 68 24 8
Export-expanding 62 29 10
Import-expanding 72 21 8
Both expanding 67 24 9
Average Manufacturing: 67 25 8
Services:
High trade sensitivity 52 26 22
Medium trade sensitivity 66 23 11
Low trade sensitivity 51 26 23
Average Services: 56 25 19
Note: Dungan and Murphy’s (1999) table based on
COPS data uses a 106-industry breakdown, which neces-
sitated allocation of some of these educational achieve-
ment data among more than one of the 115 industries
(81 manufacturing and 34 services) reported on else-
where in this study.
Source: Canadian Occupational Projection System data
reported in Dungan and Murphy (1999) and author’s cal-
culations.
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fessional services, while the non-sensitive
group includes education and health servic-
es. Nevertheless, it is a potentially impor-
tant observation in light of findings in both
Canada and the United States that educa-
tion and experience explain only part of the
widening earnings differential. The obser-
vation here suggests that the returns to edu-
cation, at least, can very much depend on
whether an employee works in an industry
that benefits from increased trade.
Gender and Age
The data from Table 3 also show a pos-
sible link between gender and exposure to
the benefits of freer trade. In manufacturing,
the industries that were already (mostly) free
of barriers had the highest proportion of male
employees. In contrast, those industries most
exposed to imports had, at the outset, the
highest proportion of female employees
(owing to their relatively high concentration
in clothing and in miscellaneous electronic
products manufacturing). In services, the
highest male/female ratio is seen in highly
trade-sensitive industries and the lowest in
the least trade-sensitive ones.
The age composition of all manufac-
turing groups and of services with a high
trade sensitivity is very similar, at least
when only three broad age groups are com-
pared, as in Table 4. Within services, how-
ever, a noticeable difference exists between
highly trade-sensitive industries, in which
the age distribution is comparable to that
of manufacturing as a whole, and others,
which clearly employ a higher proportion
of youth.
I will now turn to the question of how
these observations, based on the varying sen-
sitivity to trade, link with overall develop-
ments in the labour market.
LINKS TO OVERALL GLOBAL AND
CANADIAN LABOUR-MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS
Many but not all advanced economies
experienced rising inequalities among wage
earners, in particular males in their prime
earning years, since the 1980s. In turn, mar-
ket-driven increased earnings inequality
among men contributed in an important way
to rising income inequality among house-
holds, although this was not the only factor.3
The extent of increased inequality has varied
considerably across countries, rising most in
the United States and the United Kingdom
and least in Scandinavia and Germany. In
turn, these variations can in many cases be
linked to differences between countries in the
supply of skilled workers — i.e. with more




Gender Composition of Employees: 1986
% of All Workers Male Female
Manufacturing:
Not affected by FTA 81 19
Slow trade expansion 72 28
Export-expanding 73 27
Import-expanding 55 45
Both expanding 69 31
Average manufacturing: 71 29
Services:
High trade sensitivity 68 32
Medium trade sensitivity 52 48
Low trade sensitivity 41 59
Average services: 48 52
Source: Canadian Occupational Projection System data
reported in Dungan and Murphy (1999) and author’s cal-
culations.
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institutions also matter, and inequality
seems to be influenced by the extent of
unionization and the existence of centralized
wage-setting institutions (Gottschalk and
Smeeding 1997).
In the United States, the increased dis-
persion of earnings can be explained in part
by the sharp rise in the “college premium,”
the difference in earnings between college
graduates and high school graduates or high
school dropouts. There was also an increase
in the returns to “experience” — the differ-
ence between average and entry-level earn-
ings. Given that the relative earnings of
highly educated and experienced workers has
risen in spite of the increasing abundance of
these workers in the United States, many
observers have concluded that there had been
a shift in demand toward skilled workers,
and away from those less skilled.4 The same
can be concluded from the situation in
Canada, where earnings of highly educated
workers have not fallen in spite of the large
increase in their supply (Riddell and
Sweetman, 2000), particularly women
(Beaudry and Green, 2000). Furthermore, an
increase in the return to experience has also
been observed in Canada (Heisz, Jackson and
Picot in this volume). And it actually took a
typical worker more education and more
experience to get a job in the 1990s than in
the 1980s (Picot and Heisz 2000).
This being said, however, much of the
rise in inequality in the United States is a
result of increases in earnings inequality even
for workers within given categories of skills
and experience (“observationally equivalent
workers”) (Acemoglu 2000). The same is true
for Canada (see, again, Heisz, Jackson and
Picot in this volume).
Other major labour market develop-
ments in the 1990s in Canada were growth
in self-employment, which is not well
explained, and a decline in youth workforce
participation and employment, which is
associated with an increased tendency to stay
in school (Picot et al. 2000). While contin-
ued growth in the number of employed
women relative to men limited the variation
in earnings dispersion overall, differentials
widened between high and low earners and
between older and younger workers, partic-
ularly among men (Beaudry and Green
2000). Indeed, by following separate cohorts
of individuals up to 1993, Beaudry and
Green were able to show that young men
with only a high-school education experi-
enced an acute deterioration in terms of
access to employment in general and full-
year, full-time jobs in particular.
Considering a decline in job market out-
comes even for older generations of high
school-educated men — but not so old that
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TABLE 4
Age Composition of Employees: 1986
15-24 25-54 55 Years
% of All Workers Years  Years and Over
Manufacturing:
Not affected by FTA 15 73 12
Slow trade expansion 17 72 11
Export-expanding 19 71 10
Import-expanding 17 71 12
Both expanding 19 70 11
Average Manufacturing: 18 71 11
Services:
High trade sensitivity 16 73 11
Medium trade sensitivity 28 63 9
Low trade sensitivity 22 67 11
Average Services: 23 67 10
Source: Canadian Occupational Projection System data
reported in Dungan and Murphy (1999) and author’s cal-
culations.
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ment — the authors note that prospects for
the next generation of men with only a high
school education look very bleak. And, they
point out (p. 75), this is not even the least-
skilled group of labour-market entrants.
In sum, apart from the obvious impor-
tance of cyclical factors, the theme of the past
decade regarding labour-market outcomes in
advanced economies seems to be increased
inequalities accompanied by increased pre-
miums for skilled and/or experienced work-
ers. However, the premiums fail to entirely
explain the inequalities. While each country’s
unique experience depends on changes in its
supply of skilled workers and its labour-mar-
ket institutions, some factors that potential-
ly drive inequalities on the demand side —
including trade and technological change —
can be expected to function similarly across
all advanced countries.
Having very quickly summarized the
facts, I now turn to the question of whether
trade has likely contributed to inequality
trends in advanced economies.
Has Freer Trade Resulted in
Inequalities?
Many observers have put the emphasis
on “skill-biased technological change” as a
major reason for increases in earnings
inequality. This explanation tends to down-
play the role of trade as a cause of inequali-
ties. After all, skill levels have increased
across all industries, regardless of their trade
orientation (Lawrence 1996, p.58). There is
a rather emphatic conclusion in the litera-
ture that freer trade with developing coun-
tries accounts for only a fraction, perhaps 10
to 20 percent, of the rise in inequality actu-
ally observed in advanced economies
(Slaughter and Swagel 1997; Blanchflower
2000). Furthermore, trade with developing
countries explains almost nothing of the
overall wage stagnation that has afflicted
U.S. workers on average for most of the past
two decades. Lawrence (1996) points out
that if trade with low-wage countries had
been the culprit, a shift would have been
observed away from worker income and
towards corporate income. Such a shift did
occur, but it was small in the 1980s and
within the bounds of normal cyclical varia-
tion. Indeed, from the perspective of busi-
ness owners, real wages (in terms of what
prices the goods and services produced by
workers will fetch) actually rose much more
than they did from the workers’ point of
view (using the consumer price index). This
discrepancy is due mainly to the fact that the
price of capital goods (produced by workers,
but mostly not consumed by them) fell,
while the price of housing (consumed by
workers, but mostly not produced by them
in the present) rose.  
Nevertheless, as Acemoglu (2000)
among others notes, skilled-biased techno-
logical change falls short in some impor-
tant respects of providing an explanation
of the facts. It does not explain why there
has been an increase in wage dispersion
even within skills groups. Furthermore, he
notes, even though skills-driven techno-
logical change would be expected to result
in increased inequalities between skills
groups, “it is difficult to see how sustained
technological change can be associated
with an extended period of falling wages of
low-skill workers and stagnant average
wages” (p. 7).
Acemoglu suggests that the role of
trade in fostering inequalities can be under-
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the choice of technology. And as we saw ear-
lier, more open trade can foster the drive
toward skill-biased scale and innovation.
Indeed, an emphasis on the links between
trade, scale and innovation is needed to make
theory consistent with the observed facts,
including that much trade is conducted
between “rich” countries, rather than with
countries characterized by relatively abun-
dant low-wage, unskilled labour.
The observations about stagnant
wages overall and increased inequalities
within groups of observationally equivalent
workers have also led a number of authors
to focus on declines in the real minimum
wage (in the United States) and in union-
ization rates (observed in Canada as well) as
a cause for the drop in wages among the
low-skilled. In turn, these developments
may not be independent of trade liberaliza-
tion. Bronfenbrenner (2000) provides con-
siderable evidence that the ability of firms
to move internationally — something that
recent trade agreements facilitate — result-
ed in severely restricted union activity in
the 1990s, even though employers rarely,
in fact, followed through on threats to
move. On the other hand, Lawrence’s
observation about the fairly stable business
shares of income leads him to conclude that
the power of unions to influence income
distribution toward workers could not have
been weakened very significantly during
trade liberalization, albeit his results pre-
date the NAFTA.
Amidst the various possible links
between trade and wage inequality, it is there-
fore entirely possible that the role of more
open trade as an indirect source of growing
wage inequality has been underestimated.
Industry Trade Sensitivity and
Canadian Labour-Market
Outcomes
Can the comparison attempted above, of
data on employment, earnings and worker
characteristics and wages by industry grouped
according to sensitivity to trade liberalization,
help explain the overall job-market picture
just sketched? The data suggest, in a fairly
straightforward way, that trade is a plausible
explanation for some of the increased inequal-
ity. In the manufacturing sector, industries
exposed to imports, where workers were
already earning less than average, fared worst,
while export-oriented industries, where earn-
ings were above average, did best. Earnings
also fared badly in import-sensitive industries,
although they did not perform any better in
industries with no great sensitivity to trade,
as measured by changes in trade flows.
Similarly, the data suggest that workers
in trade-oriented services industries also gained
during the trade-liberalizing 1990s, in terms
of both employment and earnings, in contrast
to workers in less trade-sensitive industries.
Again, the winners seem to have been those in
industries that were already enjoying above-
average earnings at the beginning of the period.
The evidence suggests that, in manu-
facturing, the most negative impact of trade
liberalization occurred in industries employ-
ing workers with lower-than-average levels
of education. They also employed relatively
more women. The services industries that
tended to be most exposed to and to benefit
from trade liberalization employed a higher
proportion of men and a lower proportion of
youth compared to other services industries.
Furthermore, they employed a lower propor-
tion of workers with a high school education
or less than the economy as a whole. 
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that some of the increased inequalities
observed both between and within observa-
tionally equivalent groups may very much
depend on differences in economic trends
between industries, some of which are relat-
ed to trade. In the “prime age men’s world”
of trade-oriented manufacturing and servic-
es industries, employees in many industries
have experienced a favourable outcome, while
others whose trade stagnated have also seen
reduced employment and a relative drop in
earnings. In the services sector, those least
affected by trade liberalization fared relative-
ly worse than others, albeit not for trade-
related reasons. These sectors employed a
relatively high proportion of youth. They also
employed a high proportion of highly-edu-
cated individuals, who fared worse than indi-
viduals with similar levels of education in
trade-oriented industries.
The evidence suggests that increased
trade has rewarded the more skilled and
experienced workers relative to others. For
workers negatively affected by this trend —
those with no more than a high-school edu-
cation — it is fair to conclude from the work
of Beaudry and Green (2000) that the out-
look is bleak. Therefore, while trade open-
ness has benefited Canadians in general, it
may well have done so at the cost of
increased inequality, which impacts social
progress overall.
CONCLUSION
The social impacts of trade liberaliza-
tion not only are complex but, because of a
number of key variables, differ across coun-
tries and points in time. These key variables
include: endowment in resources, technolo-
gy and human capital; the mix of policies in
place at the time trade is being liberalized;
and whether the industries affected exhibit
economies of scale and compete on the basis
of product differentiation and innovation.
The social impact of trade liberation will
depend as well on the structure of a variety
of social institutions, including those under-
pinning labour relations.
To the extent that expanded trade
opportunities favour skill-biased change,
trade may plausibly be said to have con-
tributed to the inequality trends in Canada.
There is some evidence that the workers
hurt by trade liberalization were among the
lowest-paid in manufacturing and had rel-
atively low levels of education, and that the
“winners” were people who were already
doing well before trade liberalization. Open
trade may help to explain some of the
observed increases not only between age and
skills groups, but within group inequalities
as well, a major piece of the overall earnings
inequality puzzle. This being said, the
result on this score is not contrary to what
was expected of trade liberalization before-
hand. Furthermore, Canada has invested
heavily in education and training; by
expanding opportunities for “winners”
among the educated and highly skilled class
of individuals, trade allows Canada to reap
the benefits of its intellectual investment.
Nevertheless, it appears that expanded trade
also creates conditions that warrant a closer
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1 No information was collected on other foreign
tariffs for this article.
2 Earnings by industry were weighted by their
1988 employment weight throughout the period.
3 Other, much smaller, contributing factors
include changes in taxes and transfers and the
increased correlation between the earnings of
spouses.
4 Lawrence (1996, p. 35) makes the same point
about the relative increase in women’s earnings
in spite of a rapid increase in female labour force
participation.
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TABLE A1
Manufacturing Industries by Sensitivity to Trade Liberalization
(With 1988 Number of Employees in Thousands and Share of Total for Each Group)
Mostly Not Affected by the FTA (459.6: 23%)
Dairy products  Sawmill, planing shingle mills products
Pulp and paper  Publishing
Combined publishing and printing  Iron foundries
Nonferrous metal smelting and refining  Agricultural implements
Aircraft and aircraft parts  Motor vehicle
Motor vehicle parts and accessories  Agricultural chemical
Liberalized but Slow Trade Expansion (284.7: 14%)
Meat & poultry products  Fish products
Flour, cereal & feed  Tobacco products
Leather & allied products  Other metal rolling, casting and extruding
Fabricated structural metal products  Wire & wire products
Other metal fabricating  Shipbuilding and repair
Electrical industrial equipment  Cement
Concrete products  Ready-mix concrete
Glass and glass products  Non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
Refined petroleum products  Industrial chemicals n.e.c.
Mostly Export-Expanding (324.2: 17%)
Vegetable oil mills (exc. corn oil)  Sugar and sugar confectionery
Rubber products  Plastic products
Other furniture & fixtures  Paper boxes and bags
Other converted paper products  Platemaking, typesetting & bindery
Aluminum rolling, casting, extruding  Heating equipment
Machine shops  Commercial refrig. & air conditioning equip.
Other machinery & equipment  Boatbuilding & repair
Office, store & business machines  Other petroleum & coal products
Plastic & synthetic resin  Pharmaceutical and medicine
Import-Expanding (318.7: 16%)
Beverages Clothing
Asphalt roofing  Commercial printing
Primary steel  Steel pipes & tubes
Copper and alloy rolling, casting, extruding  Electrical and electronic products n.e.c.
Both Import- and Export-Expanding (595.6: 30%)
Fruit and vegetable  Flour, cereal & feed
Bakery products  Other food products
Primary textiles  Textile products
Sash, doors & other millwork  Wood n.e.c.
Household furniture  Office furniture
Power boilers and heat exchangers  Ornamental & architectural metal products
Stamped, pressed & coated metal products  Hardware, tools & cutlery
Truck & bus bodies & trailers  Railroad rolling stock
Major appliances  Communications & other electronic equip.
Paint & varnish  Toilet preparations
Soap & cleaning compounds  Other chemical products
Other manufacturing
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Service Industries According
to Trade Sensitivity
(with 1988 Number of Employees in





Industry of  Total
High-Sensitivity Group (946.6: 13%)
Other transport and services to transport  69.5
Storage and warehousing  50.4
Water transport and related services  44.1
Other business services  42.9
Professional business services  41.6
Advertising services  41.1
Taxicab 39.9
Truck transport  39.5
Railway transport and related services  33.9
Pipeline transport  33.3
Air transport and incidental services  29.9
Medium-Sensitivity Group (2188.1: 31%)
Other utility not elsewhere classified  27.0
Wholesale trade  26.2
Accommodation and food services 2 4.6
Miscellaneous services  23.5
Motion picture and video  23.1
Photographers 22.6
Electric power systems  20.1
Insurance 15.9
Telecommunications carriers and others  15.2
Broadcasting 14.6
Banks, credit unions and other  14.4
depository institutions
Gas distribution systems  14.3
Low-Sensitivity Group (4038.3: 56%)
Trust, other finance and real estate  13.5
Other amusement and recreational services 12.5
Postal services  12.1
Interurban and rural transit systems  11.7
Laundries and cleaners  8.4
Retail trade  6.3
Urban transit system  3.9
Educational services  0.4
Other personal services  0.3
Hospitals 0.3
Other health services  0.1
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